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The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
corporation tax cases has attracted attention to a form of business
organization that in recent years has become highly developed in
Massachusetts. Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U. S., 178, 187, held that
the corporation tax applied only to organizations deriving from
legislatures "some quality or benefit not existing at the common
law" andthat, therefore, a "real estate trust" was not included.
This real estate trust was what is known in Massachusetts as a
voluntary association. It is a combination of capital vested in
trustees who issue transferable certificates for shares and execute
a declaration of trust designed to provide for the shareholders
all the immunities of corporate shareholding. A somewhat
similar form of combination, though with less elaborate provisions
for the protection of shareholders, was used by the original Sugar
trust' and the original Standard Oil trust.2  They were held to-
be illegal combinations under state laws and corporations com-
posing them were dissolved. Apparently their scheme of organ-
ization has been little used since in States other than Massachu-
setts, except under statutes providing for the organization of
joint stock companies which give them almost, if not quite, the
status of corporations.8
I People v. North River Sugar Refining Company, 121 N. Y., 582, 623.
2 State v. Standard Oil Company, 49 Ohio St., 137, 176.
SIt has been held in Massachusetts that "joint stock associations,"
so-called, organized under the laws of other States as something distinct
from corporations may have so many of the elements of corporations that
they will be deemed to be such in applying Massachusetts statutes regulat-
ing transaction of business by foreign corporations. "When by legislative
authority or sanction an association is formed capable of acting independ-
ently of the rules and principles that govern a simple partnership, it is so
far clothed with corporate powers that it may be treated for the purposes
of taxation as an artificial body; and become subject as such to the juris-
diction of the government under which it undertakes to act in its asso-
ciated capacity." Oliver v. Liverpool & London Co., 100 Mass., 531, 540.
As to the real effect of this case see Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass., 10 Wall.,
566, Edwards v. Warren, etc., WJ, orks, 168 Mass., 564, 567. See Hibbs v.
Brown, 190 N. Y., 167. Tide Water Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 57
N. J. L., 516. By statute also certain ancient associations have been made
technical corporations in Massachusetts. Rev. Laws, Ch. 34, Sec. 1.
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Voluntary associations in Massachusetts have been in common
-use for many years, occasionally in ordinary business enterprises,
but more frequently in dealing with valuable parcels of real
-estate. Massachusetts has perpetuated the old fear of mortmain
-by forbidding organization of corporations under general laws to
deal in real estate. Hence all modern office buildings and hotels
had to be financed by voluntary associations and investors became
familiar with these securities. To avoid the strict limitations
.on capitalization of public service corporations, the same form
was adopted to organize holding companies which now control
nearly two-thirds of the street railway mileage, and one-half the
gas produced in the State. Taxation of business corporations,
especially the inquisitorial features of the Federal law, have led
two large manufacturing establishments controlled in Boston to
abandon the corporate form for the voluntary association. This
illustrates one of the most interesting tendencies in the law, the
reaction from corporation to partnership in industrial organiza-
tions, which keen observers have detected in smaller business
enterprises. It may well be that the high development of the
form of these "voluntary associations" or trusts will be given
-more sympathetic treatment by the courts than were the first
attempts of the merchants to organize partnerships, that their
-evident intent will be made effectual and that the partnership will
again take its place as an effective method of co6perative finance.
Common law associations with transferable shares take differ-
-ent forms due to two different sources of legal sanction, one the
partnership, the other the trust. An early form, which is still
found occasionally in co6perative stores, is a simple association
with constitution and by-laws providing for transferable shares
.representing the fractional interests of the members, but usually
snot containing very elaborate provisions for protection of the
members from individual liability for debts of the association.
4
When. engaged primarily in commercial enterprise, they have
always been held partnerships.5  In all jurisdictions, however,
.are found numerous decisions holding that associations so organ-
4 Tyrrell v. Washburn, 6 Al., 466; Ashley v. Dowling, 203 Mass., 311,
-317.
5 It was held that the Sugar trust was a partnership and the corpora-
tion entering the partnership ultra -,ires was therefore dissolved. People
. North River Co., 121 N. Y., 582, 623. The Court mentioned but did not
-decide the question in State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St., 137, 176.
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ized but not primarily for business purposes, are not partnerships.
With such social or semi-social bodies this article has no concern.
The more important form of business association, however, is
created by a declaration of trust by two or more individual trus-
tees reciting that they are to acquire certain property usually either
real estate or corporate securities, and will hold it upon trusts
somewhat as follows: To avoid the rule against perpetuities the
trust is limited, if not sooner terminated, to twenty years after
the death of the survivor of the trustees, and a number of other
persons named, some of whom are usually children of prominent
shareholders. The management of the trust estate is Vested
usually in the trustees, but sometimes in a separate board of
directors. It is usually provided that the trustees shall be self-
perpetuating, but if they are also the managers, the shareholders
frequently have power to elect or remove them. Subscribers to
the trust fund receive transferable certificates for stock resembling
as closely as possible corporate stock. There is provision for
meetings and certain powers of the shareholders may be exercised
by vote. The most interesting provisions, however, are those
by which it is attempted to eliminate personal liability for debts
of the concern. The following quotation is from the deed of a
well known real estate trust operating a large office building in
Boston:
"The shareholders hereunder shall not be liable for any assess-
ment and the trustees shall have no power to bind the shareholders
personally. In every written order, contract, or obligation, which
the trustees shall authorize or enter into, it shall be their duty to
stipulate or cause to be stipulated that neither the trustees nor
share-holders shall be held to any personal liability under or by
reason of such order, contract or obligation, and to refer or cause
reference to be made to this agreement.
"Every act done, power exercised or obligation assumed by
the trustees personally under the provisions of this instrument or
in carrying out the trusts herein contained shall be held to be done,
exercised or assumed, as the case may be, by them as trustees and
not as individuals, and every person or corporation contracting
with the trustees, as well as beneficiary hereunder, shall look only
to the fund and property of the trust for payment under such
contract or for the payment of any debt, mortgage, judgment or
6 It has been held by a majority of the Court that even without this
limitation such a trust does not violate the rule against perpetuities. The
report of this case contains the full text of a real estate trust deed, though
not of the most improved type. Howe v. Morse, 174 Mass., 491.
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decree,- or the payment of any money that may otherwise become
due or payable on account of the trusts herein provided for or
any other pbligation arising under this agreement in whole or in
part; and neither the trustees nor the shareholders, present or
future, shall be personally liable therefor.
"No bond or surety or sureties shall ever be required of any
trustee acting hereunder, and each trustee shall be liable only for
his own acts, and then only for willful breach of trust."
Though associations which are engaged in trade have been
long held partnerships whether their property is vested in the
association 7 or in trustees for it,8 it has been generally supposed
till recently that real estate trusts engaged in renting offices or
perhaps merely renting an entire building to a tenant would not
be deemed partnerships.
The reasoning of a leading English case supports this view. An
English statute required that "no company, association or part-
nership consisting of more than twenty persons shall be formed
after the commencement of this act for the purpose of carrying
on any other business (than banking) that has for its object the
acquisition of gain by the company, association or partnership or
by the individual members, unless it is registered." In the lower
court Jessel M. R. held that a trust similar to our real estate trust
formed to acquire investment securities was such an association.
"There are many things which in common colloquial English
would not be called a business even when carried on by a single
person which would be so called when carried on by a number of
persons. This is a distinction not to be forgotten even if we
were trying the question by the ordinary use of the English lan-
guage. For instance, a man who is the owner of offices, that is,
of a house divided into several floors and used for commercial
purposes, would not be said to carry on a business because he let
the offices as such: but suppose a company was formed for the
purpose of buying a building or leasing a house to be divided into
offices and to be let out, should not we say if that was the object
of the company that the company was carrying on business for the
purpose of letting offices or was an office letting company, trying
it by the use of ordinary colloquial language.
"When you come to an association or company formed for a
purpose you say at once that it is a business because there you
have that from which you would infer continuity."
7 Alvord v. Sinith, 5 Pick., 232, 235; Taft v. Ward, 106 Mass., 518.
8 Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass., 510.
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In the Court of Appeals the decision was reversed. Lord
Justice James said: "But I believe that according to the ver-
nacular we use on these subjects the difference which the act
intended to draw between a company or association and an
ordinary partnership is this: An ordinary partnership is a part-
nership composed of definite individuals bound together by con-
tract between themselves to continue combined for some joint
object, either during pleasure or during a limited time, and is
essentially composed of the persons originally entering into the
contract with one another. A company or association (which I
take to be synonymous terms) is the result of an arrangement by
which parties intend to form a partnership which is constantly
changing, a partnership to-day consisting of certain members and
to-morrow consisting of some only of those members along with
others who have Eome in, so that there will be a constant shifting
of the partnership, a determination of the old and a creation of
a new partnership, and with the intention that, so far as the part-
ners can by agreement between themselves bring about such a
result, the new partnership shall succeed to the assets and liabili-
ties of the old partnership. This object as regards liabilities
could not in point of law be attained by any arrangement between
the persons themselves, unless the persons contracting with them
authorized the change by a novation, or unless by special pro-
visions in Acts of Parliament sanction was given to such arrange-
ments."
Lord Justice Brett said: "I confess I have some difficulty in
seeing how there could be an association for the purpose of carry-
ing on a business which could be neither a company nor a partner-
ship, but I should hesitate to say that, by the ingenuity of men
of business, there might not some day be formed a relation among
twenty persons which, without being strictly either a company
or a partnership, might yet be an association.
"Where it is a joint stock company, or a corporation, or quasi
corporation, and the individuals are mere shareholders, then the
gain which is acquired by the business is a gain by the company,
and not a gain by the individual shareholders. But where it is
an ordinary partnership, or where it is an association which, not
being a joint stock company or corporation, is more like to a part-
nership, there the gain will not be by the whole body as distinct
from the individuals, but by the individual partners.
"Let us now consider whether in the present case there were
any persons associated for the purpose of carrying on any business
such as is described in this clause. If there were such persons,
they must have been either the trustees or the certificate holders.
In my opinion neither the one nor the other were associated
together for the purpose of carrying on such a business, as is
described in the act. I will take first the trustees them-elves.
The trustees were not, as I construe the deed, to enter upon a
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series of acts which, if successful, would obtain a gain. They
were joined together for the purpose of once for all investing
certain money which was delivered into their hands, and not for
the purpose of obtaining gain from a repetition of investments.
In other words, they were not associated together for the purpose
of speculating in shares. That was not their business. There
was no reason why, when they had once made an investment, it
should, under ordinary circumstances, -ever be changed. There-
fore it seems to me that the primary and substantial object of
their associating together was not for the purpose of carrying on
a business which, if successful, would result in the acquisition
of gain.
"But supposing that this was such a business as is mentioned in
the act, were the certificate holders the persons who were to carry
it on?. It seems to me that they certainly were not. I take it
that the persons called trustees in the deed are clearly trustees as
distinguished from agents and from directors. The distinction
has been pointed out by my Lord, and -I entirely agree with it.
If, indeed, although they were called trustees, the duties which
they had to perform were really those of directors, then, although
they were -called trustees, the legal effect of -the deed would be
that they would be directors, and if they are directors they are
agents; but here it seems to me clear that according to the true
construction of the deed they were not directors or agents, but
trustees. If that be so, the certificate holders, even if they were
associated at all, were not associated for carrying on the business.
It was not their business. They could not have been made liable
for any contract made by the trustees. It was of course urged
that they would be liable as undisclosed principals. But that
assumes that the persons who made the contracts upon which
they are to be liable a~e their agents authorized to bind them by
their contracts, which is obviously not true. Therefore, even
if there be here a business within the meaning of the section, yet
it is not carried on by the certificate holders, who are of a larger
number than twenty, but by the trustees, who are not of the
number of twenty or more; and therefore in either- view the case
is not within the statute."
Lord justice Cotton said: "If it appeared that the real'object
of the 'deed was that the trustees should speculate in investments,
'even though confined to this particular class, the case would have
stood in a very different position. In my opinion there is noth-
ing of that sort. This is not a provision that they shall make a
profit by selling and buying again securities of this class, when-
ever, in their opinion, the turn of the market makes it advisable
so to dg. The deed is in substance a trust -deed, providing how
they are to hold as trustees specified securities of a large amount
with provisions enabling them in certain events to sell' some of
the securities, and enabling them when that is done, but only
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under special circumstances, to reinvest, not to speculate. In
my opinion that is not a deed providing for carrying on a business
within the meaning of the act, it is a deed providing for the hold-
ing trust property, with such provisions only as are necessary to
enable that to be conveniently done. I am of opinion, therefore,
that there is no carrying on business within the meaning of the
act."
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has recently declined to
follow this in deciding whether a real estate trust for the purpose
of erecting a hotel and leasing it was taxable in Boston as a part-
nership or in the residences of the shareholders as beneficiaries
of a trust. The court said: "There is no doubt that they are
joint owners of property for whose benefit the business is being
carried on, in which profits or loss will affect them all propor-
tionally through the increase or diminution of the value of their
respective interests in the trust. In the leading and substantial
features that distinguish ordinary partnerships, this association
is within the spirit and meaning of the law of partnership. The
limitations upon the power and liability of individual members
and the attempt to avail themselves of many of the privileges of
stockholders in corporations relate more to details and to the
machinery of management than to the substantive purpose of the
enterprise."'10
Shortly after the court also decided that it would be ultra vires
for the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company
to develop its vacant land in Park Square, Boston, by forming a
real estate trust and taking shares in payment. It was argued
that the objections to a corporation entering a partnership did not
apply because by the deed of trust there was no personal liability
of shareholders. The court ignored this argument and said "it
will be virtually if not technically in partnership with them.""
It is still possible that if an entire building or piece of land were
rented and the only function of the trustees was to collect rents
and make certain repairs, it would be held a tenancy in common
and not a partnership. In most cases, however, the powers con-
ferred on the trustees in the deed of trust are much broader than
0 Smith v. Anderson, 15 L. R. Ch. Div. 247, 259, 273, 274, 280, 283.
10 "The question arises from the fact that the petitioners are trustees
of an association of shareholders in an enterprise for the .purchase,
improvement and management of real estate." TWilliamns v. Boston, 208
Mass., 497, 500.
- Willial)s . Johnson, 208 Nlass.. 544.
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that, and would permit some kind of trade. 2 There is, of course,
a well known distinction between ordinary partnerships and ten-
ancies in common, though the distinction is frequently hard to
apply.13  The test is proprietorship of a commercial enterprise
as distinguished from mere ownership of property for whose use
or from whose use compensation is jointly derived. There seems
no reason why a similar distinction should not be applied in deal-
ing with the more complicated voluntary association.
It is also possible that the share holding trusts whose trustees
are engaged in operating only so far as they elect directors of the
corporations controlled by them will be held not partnerships.
Since the broader questions of policy of the corporations are
doubtless dictated by the trustees, it seems likely that they will
be held partnerships.
It is also familiar law that partners may by agreement modify
their common law obligation but that such modifications will not
be binding on those who deal with the firm without notice
thereof.'
4
Recording the deed of trust in the registry of deeds would be
notice only to those dealing with the real estate. The statutory
requirement for filing a copy of the deed of trust with the town
clerk and commissioner of corporations is not thereby made notice
to any one.'3 It has been said, in the case of what was really not
a partnership but a social club, that the nature of the association
may give notice of limitation of liability of members.'6 The time
may come when the custom of limiting liability of members of
these voluntary associations is so familiar that our courts can
find constructive notice of it.
There is no decision in Massachusetts, however, that if partners
agree that certain of their members shall not be liable to creditors
in any form for the debts of the firm, the creditors even contract-
ing with notice of that provision, would be prevented from join-
ing such members as defendants.' Much less that a provision
1'Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass., 202.
Is French v. Styring, 2 C. B. n. s., 357; Goell v. Morse, 126 Mass., 480.
S4 Tyrell v. Washburn, 6 Al., 466. See Manning v,. Gasl arie, 27 Ind.,
399, 415; Walburn v. In gilby, 1 My. & K., 61, 76.
15 Acts of 1909, Ch. 441.
1 Volger v. Ray, 131 Mass., 439.
17 There was apparently no limitation on the liability of shareholders,
in Bodwell v. Eastman, 105 Mass., 525, 527, and the other cases of the same
period relating to express companies. In Cook v. Gray, 133 Mass., 106,
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that no member of the firm should be personally liable and that a
creditor's only remedy would be to attach firm goods would be
enforced by the court. The attitude of the court toward such
provisions is suggested by the following from the opinion in
Hussey v. Arnold: "We do not attempt to determine whether all
the provisions of this agreement are enforceable in the courts or
whether there are such considerations of public policy involved
in an attempt of this kind to do business without legal liability of
anybody for debts incurred by the trustees as merit consideration
by the legislature."' 8  In England we find a number of cases
dealing with joint stock companies where limitations similar to
those above quoted were construed. Although not the form now
most common, they were held not to bind creditors in the absence
of express contract.' 9
A contrary result was reached in the Federal Courts. Here
the trustees did refer to the deed of trust in their contract though
not expressly contracting against liability of shareholders. It
was an action at law on a note of A, "trustee, as trustee under
declaration of trust dated," etc. The Court held that this obli-
gated the plaintiff "by its implied agreement in accepting the note
to abide by the terms of the articles of association. Whether or
niot the plaintiff examined the articles of association or knew
their contents is of no consequence because this express provision
required it to do so or take the hazard of not doing it.
"Therefore the only question is whether or not this implied
stipulation of the plaintiff limiting its remedy to the general assets
of the association and the property specially pledged to it, is con-
trary to the rules of law. Of course a stipulation in an instru-
ment which fundamentally violates its essential nature must some-
times be rejected by the courts. For instance, if any individual
or partnership should stipulate in his or its pecuniary obligations
109, some very simple articles of association were interpreted as not
intended to limit liability of stockholders and they were allowed joined as
defendants in contract at law. Under Massachusetts statutes it would
not be necessary to join all members of associations even where non-
joinder is pleaded in abatement. Bank of Topeka v. Eaton, 95 Fed., 355
(C. C-Mass.-1899).
I8 Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass., 202, 204.
19 Greenwood's Case, 3 De G. M. & G., 459, 476, 482. Restrictions on
liability of partners bind only themselves as to their right to contribution.
Hawken v. Bourne, 8 M. & W., 703; Smith v. Hall Glass Co., 8 Com. B.,
668, 11 Com. B., 897; Hallett v. Dowdel, 18 Q. B. 2, 43,-53.
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that he or it should not be personally liable thereon, without at
the game time mortgaging or pledging property or giving some
other specific lien for security, it might be difficult for the law to
regard the stipulation, because in that event as there would be
no lien that the law could enforce, the holder of the obligation
would be left without remedy unless he could proceed by judgment
against the obligor; and the result, if sustained, would be an
obligation which in law is no obligation. The present case, how-
ever, assimulates itself to the large class of cases where certain
property being pledged in some form for the security of a debt,
the parties have been at liberty to stipulate that the owner of the
debt should look only to the property thus pledged. In 'the
present case not only did the Bank of Topeka have specific assets
given it for its- security but the entire property of the association
was held in trust and therefore subject to administration by the
chancery courts, which could apply it equitably and proportionally
to the discharge of obligations incurred by the trustee as contem-
plated by the express direction of the articles of association that
the debtors of the trust should look for payment solely to its
property."
Hence individual shareholders were held not liable.20
In another case in the Federal Court there is a dictum in favor
of the enforcibility of such provisions.21
It is evident, however, from the form of limitation now favored
that reliance is not placed on the doctrine of notice alone. It is
intended to incorporate the abandonment by the creditor of his
common law rights in an express contract. The tendency of the
decisions is to uphold this if sufficiently clear and this, it is sub-
mitted, is the correct principle. Of course, one contracting with
trustees of such an association may expressly agree that he will
not hold the trustees to personal liability. In that case he cannot
2QBank of Topeka v. Eaton, 100 Fed., 8 (C. C.-Mess.-1900), affd.
by C. C. A., 107 Fed., 1003; Acc. Industrial Co. v. Texas, 31 Tex. Civ.
App., 375.
21 A judgment was obtained against agents of an association person-
ally for work done for this association. They were also shareholders,
They 'contended they could not be 'held because of provisions in thearticles of association that every person dealing -with them "disavows
having recourse on any pretence whatever to the person or separate prop-
erty of any present or future member of the company." Held: At most
only a contract not to enforce his judgment against them -personally. Ifh'e attempted-to breal it, equity might grant an injunction. Davis V.
Beverly, 2 Cranh. C. C., 35.
820
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sue the trustees at all at law.22  It has been hinted ihat the bene-
ficiaries might be liable in equity as principals. 28  If the contract
expressly provided, however, that no action could be brought
against any one, but the only remedy of the contractor was to
reach the trust fund, it is doubtful if such provision would be
held binding.24
There is an early decision in Pennsylvania which accepted with
reluctance the right to forestall individual liability by contract.
Notes were issued by an unincorporated banking association con-
taining the stipulation that they were payable "out of their joint
funds, according to the articles of association," Gibson, J., said:
"I see no reason to doubt, but they may limit their responsibility
by an explicit stipulation made with the party with whom they
contract and clearly understood by him at the time. But this is
a stipulation so unreasonable on the part of the partnership and
affording such facility for the commission-of fraud, that unless
it appears unequivocally plain from the terms of the contract, I
will never suppose it to have been in the view of the parties."
He therefore held the members liable.
25
In a recent New York case of a statutory joint stock associa-
tion the majority of the judges seem to have felt that such a pro-
vision was void as against public policy.28
22 Shoe & Leather Nat. Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass., 148, 151.
2aHussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass., 202, 204. But see Taylor v. Davis, 110
U. S., 330.
24 Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y., 167, 186, 196.
25 Hess v. Werts, 4 Serj. & R., 356, 361. "This company (insurance
umderwriters) or association was not incorporated and was in nowise
exempted by law from. partnership liability, except as it should by agree-
ment with the insured actually and explicitly so exempt itself. This does
not mean that seemingly constructive notice which is so contrived and
intended as to be hidden in the letter and not to be perceived or suggested
until searched out of its lurking place after a loss. It means a notice so
plain and fair that the party to be charged with it either receives it or it is
his own fault if he does not." Imperial Shale Brick Co. v. Jewett, 169
N. Y., 143, 150.
20 A statutory joint stock company of New York, the Adams Express
Company, issued bonds stipulating against personal liability of members
and making them payable only out of the funds of the company. The
issue was whether the provision limiting payment to the fund made them
non-negotiable. Held: It. did not. O'Brien on the ground that they were
practically corporations by statute. Werner, Bartlett, and Cullen on the
ground that the limitation of liability was against public policy and void.
"Personal liability preserved by the legislature and recognized by the
courts." O'Brien intimated that if it were an ordinary partnership he
might agree on that. Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y., 167.
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The English courts, however, uphold such contracts.27  They
say that the individuals who sign the contract personally contract
that the capital stock or funds of the company shall be applied to
answer the claim on the contract and also that each shareholder
may be sued and recovered against to the extent of his unpaid
subscriptions. 28  They hold he is also liable if the fund to which
liability is limited is non-existent by his own fault.
2 9
A contract to pay out of specific funds does not create a charge
on those funds, 0 but even before time of payment, the creditor
may prevent the fund from being misapplied. 81  This does not
amount, however, to an implied contract to continue to carry on
the business.8 2  It will be practically impossible to sue at law on
such contracts, the remedy will be in equity.33
Complications may arise, moreover, as to the exact effect of
transfer of shares in such an association on the liability of mem-
bers. It has been held that a new shareholder is not personally
liable for debts contracted before he became an owner.814 In
accordance with the law applicable to ordinary partnerships it has
been held that a member who sells and transfers his share is liable
for debts contracted while he was a member,85 and for debts
27 A contract of insurance stipulated that "the said policy or anything
therein contained shall in no case extend or be deemed or construed to
extend to charge or render liable the respective proprietors of the said
company or any of them" etc., "to any claim or demand whatsoever in
respect of the said policy or of the assurance thereby made beyond the
amount of their, his or her individual shares or share in the capital stock
of the said company, but that the capital stock and funds of the said com-
pany shall alone be charged and liable to answer all claims and demands by
virtue of the said assurance or incident thereto." Held: To preclude
any action at law against an individual shareholder. Halket v. Merchants,
etc., Association, 13 Q. B., 960; Hallett v. Dowdell, 18 Q. B. 2, 43, 54.
28 Hallet v. Dowdell, 18 Q. B. 2, 43, 55.
2 9 McIntyre v. Belcher, 14 C. B. n. s., 654.
80 Sovereign Life Assurance Co. (1892), 3 Ch., 279; Albert Life Assur-
ance Co., 9 Eq., 706; Industrial Co. v. Texas Association, 31 Tex. Civ. App.,
375, 380. •
81 Kearns v. Leaf, 1 Hem. & M., 681; State Fire fits. Co., 1 De G. J. &
Sm., 634.
82 King v. Accumulative Co., 3 C. B. n. s., 151.
8 Hallet v. Dowdell, 18 Q. B. 2. See Grain's Case, 1 Ch. D. 315, 322.
s4 Shamburg v. Ruggles, 83 Pa., 148; Thomas v. Clark, 18 C. B., 662;
M. W. Powell Co. v. Finn, 198 Ill., 567.
88 Camden R. R. v. Guarantors of Penn., 59 N. J. L., 328.
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incurred thereafter until notice.30  In most cases, however, he
would prove to have been a dormant partner, who is not bound
to give notice to terminate his liability.37
Does death dissolve a voluntary association? Technically it
may be a new association after the death of each member, but by
joining the association there is an implied agreement to continue
a member in each new association thus formed,38 or, as has been
said, less evidence of an intent to continue the business is
required.3' No distribution of the assets can be compelled, but
the business continues as before.40  Upon death of a member
where it is provided that "the representative of the deceased shall
succeed to the rights of the deceased in the certificate and the
shares it represents, subject to the declaration of trust," there is
imposed on the estate of the deceased the liability the deceased
would have incurred toward debts regardless of whether the
executor decides to become a member of the firm or not. In an
ordinary partnership the estate would not become liable for future
debts unless the executor decided to become personally a partner,
even where the articles had stipulated that he should become a
partner. But a majority of the court held that in a voluntary
association there was by this provision an implied agreement of
indemnity by each partner against the debts of the association as
long as he held his shares, which agreement could be enforced
against the estate of the deceased.
4
1
Transfer of a share may be held technically to dissolve the asso-
ciation,42 but subject to the implied agreement of the other mem-
bers to continue as partners, so that the others who have not
transferred their shares cannot escape liability on that ground.
The Massachusetts Court has not expressly said whether there is
a dissolution or not, but has said that transferability of shares is
36 Tyrrell v. Washburn, 6 Al., 466; N. Y. Bank v. Crowell, 177 Pa. St.,
313; Farnam v. Patch, 60 N. H., 294, 326; Grady v. Robinson, 28 Ala., 289,
297.
37 Grosvenor v. Lloyd, 1 Met., 19.
38 Tyrrell v. Washburn, 6 Al., 466.
39 Machinists' Bank v. Dean, 124 Mass., 81, 84.
40 Taber v. Breck, 192 Mass., 355, 361.
41Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass., 510, 514. Of course the executor
does not become a member or personally liable until he consents. Wells v.
Murray, 4 Ex., 843, 868.
42 Wadswort-h v. Duncan, 164 Ill., 360, 364. This case held that the
new firm assumed the liabilities of the old, and that members of the new
firm could not plead non-joinder of the retiring members.
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legal. 43  A member who pays a debt of the association is-entitled-
to contribution .
44
But the danger to partners does not arise during comfortable
business times. It comes with financial failures due usually to
the carelessness or dishonesty of representatives. The distin-
guished gentlemen now acting as trustees doubtless may safely be
trusted even to delegate wisely their authority necessarily involved
in the management of these large interests. But can the share-
holders be sure that their successors in the trust will be equally
trustworthy? As yet these trusts are held by individuals and
not by trust companies, just as the early railroad trust mortgages
were held by individual financiers. It may be that this business
will be transferred ultimately to the trust companies, although
they are now hardly equipped to manage directly industrial enter-
prises. The risks to shareholders are even more obvious in the
trusts whose assets consist of stocks and bonds of public service
corporations on which other bonds are often issued. The assur-
ance of a trust estate sufficient to meet obligations is less likely
than in the case of real estate. This was the reason for the
decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court that shares in the
Massachusetts Electric Companies, a V~oluntary association hold-
ing bonds and stocks of the street railways of Eastern Massachu-
setts outside of Boston was an improper investment for trustees."
4SPhillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass., 510; Ashley v. Dowling, 203 Mass.,
311. Lord Eldon suggested that unless the contrary was provided in the
articles, a retiring member would have to notify all other shareholders
before a dissolution resulted. Van Sandau v. Moors, 1 Russ., 441, 463.
But the ordinary provision for transfer of shares would doubtless have
satisfied him. Lindley says transfer results in a new firm. Lind. Part
7th Eng. Ed., p. 401. Held: No dissolution where articles of partnership
permit transfer of shares, but rights of third parties not affected. Merrick
v. Brainerd, 38 Barb., 574, 578. See Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning,
45 Barb., 231, 243.
44 Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass., 510; Taber v. Breck, .192 Mass.,
355, 361, 365; Comm. v. Rosen, 176 Mass., 129, 130.
45 After the opinion in this case was handed down and printed in an
unofficial publication called the Banker & Tradesman, of June 27, 1908,
counsel called the attention of the, court to an error in the proceedings
below which it was claimed should have deprived the court of juviWdiction'.
The opinion was thereupon withdrawn and the case recommitted to the
lower 6ourt, where it was imnlediately settled The case was not decided
on-the ground that it was a partnership. Indeed, it may still be that the
court will follow Smith v. Anderson, supra, as to these holding trusts.
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
The causes of the development of these associations are doubt-
less the desire to escape troublesome statutes regulating corpora-
tions which interfere with plans for combination and stock water-
ing, the unpleasant certainty of taxation, and the publicity of
returns. Is there any immunity from regulation in these associa-
tions which derive no franchise from the State?
It was originally supposed that Eliot v. Freemant" decided that
real estate trusts could not constitutionally be taxed, but the court
simply said. that the statute as written did not include them. " It
is to be noted, however, that the justification 'of the constitution-
ality of the Federal Corporation Tax is put on the'ground that it
is a tax on a privilege conferred by the State or Federal govern-
ment, and the real estate trusts are said to have no such privilege.
Except for the filing statute above noted, Massachusetts hs
not yet attempted to regulate these associations, though by order
of the legislature the tax commissioner is now conducting an
investigation with a view to such legislation.
There has been no decision of our State Court directly passing
upon the right to regulate voluntary associations as distinguished
from all other partnerships. It has been held that shares in i ol-
untary associations cannot be taxed to the owner.47  But that the
association, like other partnerships, must be assessed in the town
of its principal place of business. 48 The distinction made between
shares in corporations and shares in associations was that whereas
the former were property under Massachusetts decisions, the
latter simply represented an undivided partnership interest in -the
net assets of the association which was otherwise taxed.
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It has been held that the corporate franchise tax, an excise on
the corporation based on the excess in market value of its aggre-
gate share capital over the assessed value of its tangible property
otherwise taxed, cannot be extended to associations. 0  The
reasons given were that the association did not ask any special
privilege of the legislature and that its peculiar features were
created by agreement of the members under their natural rights
at common law. "We do not see how this peculiar feature
46 220 U. S., 178, 187.
47 Hoadley v. County Commissioners, 105 Mass., 519, 526.
48 Ricker v. American Loan & Trust Co., 140 Mass., 346, 349; Williaius
v'. Boston, 208 Mass., 497.
49 Hoadley v. County Commissioners, 105 Mass., 519, 526.
50 Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mass., 419, 425.
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(transferability of share's) can be called a commodity, subject to
special excise, any more than the agreement of copartnership itself
or any clause or part of it or any other agreement, right or mode
of transacting any business can be called a commodity and so
liable to taxation at the will of the legislature." The true mean-
ing of this decision has been the subject of discussion in subse-
quent decisions.51
Not long since the legislature exercised its constitutional right
and asked the opinion of the justices on the constitutionality of a
stock transfer tax including a tax on shares in voluntary associa-
tions. The judges differed in opinion, a majority holding such
a tax valid; three on the ground that an excise in this State can
be levied on a privilege which is the exercise of a natural right.
Four judges denied this, and three held that transferability of
shares in a partnership is an immaterial distinction from other
partnerships and cannot be a basis for classification, but one (now
the Chief Justice) held that transferability of such shares was not
a natural right because a business dependent on such elaborate
provisions which require constant resort to the courts for their
enforcement may be regulated by the legislature, but he did think
that an excise on the existence of such an association or on the
holding of property by it would be unconstitutional. It is not
entirely clear whether or not the justices thought that doing
business in the form of a partnership is taxable provided that the
excise applies to all partnerships.
5 2
Boston, Mass. S. R. Wrightington.
r- See Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass., 113.
52 Opinion of the Justices, 196 Mass., 601, 615, 620, 626.
